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Droft Recommendotion
on the NATO Summit and ils implicotions for Europe
The Assembly,
(i) Hoping the Washington Summit will be a success. thanks to the adoption of a new Strategic
Concept. tailored to meet tlre requirements of the changing situation and making possible the en-
hancement and expansion of the Atlantic Alliance as a key element of Europe's security;
(ii) Stressing the fundamental consequences of the decisions on the new Strategic Concept to be
taken at this summit for the role that the European Union rvill be able to play on the international
stage;
(iii) Considering, like the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. that "NATO must retain
the flexibility to respond to the real problems we recogrrise as real challenges to our security. But
equally. of course. that cannot be a purely open-ended commitment",
(iv) Stressing the fundamental dift'erence in nature between, on the one hand. collective defence,
founded on solidarity and an automatic procedure and. on the other hand, participation iu crisis man-
agement, based on the readiness of individual nations on a case-by-case basis;
(v) Noting thatNATO, as a matter of principle. can only concern itself with the management of
crises emerging on its periphery, but that it may be desirable in certain cases for Europeans and
Americans to consult each other on out-of-area security matters:
(t,i) Noting that some allies hold the vierv that NATO can give itself a mandate for missions call-
ing for the use of force, while other allies consider that all out-of-area rnilitary action should in prin-
ciple be founded on a UN or OSCE mandate, save in such exceptional cases as the threat of a humani-
tarian disaster or serious violations of human rights:
(t,ii) Noting the detennination of the United States not to change the Alliance's nuclear strategy,
given that such a change would in its eyes only weaken the Alliance, and recalling that the "nuclear
umbrella" is a sire que non for the presence of American troops in Europe;
(y'iii) Recalling the proposals made in Assembly Document 1420 on the role and future of nuclear
weapons (Rapporteur Mr De Decker, June 1994);
(ix) Welcomingthe impressive progress made in the field of NATO-WEU cooperation on the de-
velopment of the ESDI within the Alliance since the 1996 NATO Berlin Surnmit and the July 1997
Madrid Declaration on securitl' and Euro-Atlantic cooperation;
(x) Noting nevertheless that although the ESDI currently being developed within NATO is very
useful, it does not give Europe a "capacity for autonomous action" (Saint Malo Franco-British Decla-
ration) under all circumstances;
(xi) Noting that the ESDI within NATO means that the United States can leave Europe to take ac-
tion on the ground while retaining political control of crisis management through the North Atlantic
Council;
(xii) Emphasising the real difficulties involved in defining a European chain of command within
the Alliance:
(xiii) Noting that the negotiations on a NATO-WEU framework agreement on tlre use of Alliance
assets and capabilities by WEU have not yet been completed and that all the partners are resolved to
finalise this agreement before the Washington Summit;
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(riv) Aware that the United States, rvhich is planning to increase its defence expenditure by 10%
this y'ear, takes the vieu that a stronger ESDI would be a means of allaying its concerns about the in-
sufficient burden that is shouldered by' its European allies;
(xt') Noting that the United States sLlpports the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration. provided
that the achievements of the Berlin Summit are not lost and that the'-3D" concept 
- 
no decoupling,
duplication or discrimination 
- 
is applied:
(xvi.) Taking the vieu that the North Atlantic Council's determination to control the use of NATO
assets made available to WEU. through the requirernent that it approve the planning by NATO nrili-
tary' staffs. stronglv irnpinges on the autonomy of an operation conducted "under the political control
and strategic direction of WEU" (Berlin Declaration. June 1996):
(x'r'ii1 Noting the American desire to develop a common vision and operational capability founded
on the RMA (RevolLrtion in Military Affairs) concepts and taking the vierv that this objective is prac-
ticallf impossible to attain for many European countries:
/-tlrrr) Noting that Europeans are being realistic in pursuing their efforts to adapt their military ca-
pability'to peacekeeping missions, involving forces that can be projected and achieve interoperability,
bl,means of NATO proceduresl
(rir) Stressing that the priority for European defence industries. before seeking to conclude transat-
lantic agreements, is their restructuring at European level;
(rx) Considering the growing risk to European territories from the \ eapons of mass destruction
held by certain states on the periphery of Europe and also American determination to develop
coLrnter-pro I iferation w ith i n the N ATO frameu,ork.
(xri) Noting that Western European Union has developed good relations rvith its 28 rnember and
associate cottntries, some of rvhich are ueither E,uropean Union nor NATO members and that such
relations must be retained. in particularthose with the countries of central Europe. and also that these
countries must not be excluded frorn participation in both NATO and CFSP discussions:
(rxii) Noting the valuable role played by'Turkey and concerned that as this country is not a member
of the Ettropean Union, its future role in European defence and security,affairs must be safeguarded;
lrxttr) Welcomins the recent enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to take in the Czech Republic,
Hungary' and Poland;
(xrir'1 Recalling the links that exist between any decision of the Atlantic Alliance on the future
"open door" policy'and Europe's fundamental interest in seeing all central European countries u'hich
are WEU associate partners included in the security'area frorn which the countries of western Europe
currently benefit:
/-rxr) Aware of the desire of certain European countries to reach the level required for future acces-
sion to the Alliance and supporting the considerable efforts they have made to that endt
(xrvi) Welcoming, pending firrlher enlargernent of the Alliance. the essential role of WEU in irrvolv-
ing the observer and associate partner countries in decisions taken on European defence;
(rxt'ii) Noting the imporlance for Europe's stability of relations in the field of security'and defence
policy between NATO and Russia. on the one hand. and NATO and Ukraine, on the other;
(xxviii)Welcoming both the smooth way in which the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
is operating as a forum for erchanging information and the ties being developed with Ukraine in tlie
framervork of the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter:
(xrix) Recognising the role of the North Atlantic Assembly'in providing for parliamentary scrutiny
of NATO decisions and liaison between national parliaments.
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
I . Contribute. rvith a vieu' to the fofthcoming Atlantic Alliance Summit, to the framing of a E,uro-
pean position founded on the fbllorving principles:
(a/ support for a new Strategic Concept whose airn is to maintain and strengthen the transatlan-
tic ties essential to Europe's security' and stability. through full participation in the development
of the new NATO:
/07 ensuring that the new NATO and the ESDI 
- 
inside and outside NATO 
- 
lead to greater re-
sponsibilities for Europeans matched by a greater contribution towards their own security, by
achieving a better balance vis-d-vis the United States, in particular by contributing a larger
share to the budget:
/(, no change to the Alliance's core function. which must remain exclusively'the collective de-
fence of its members. u'ith crisis management to be added only' as a complernentary activity;
(d) no unlimited extension of the missions of NATO 
"vhich rnust remain those of a militarycoalition and which must not be superimposed on those of other international orsanisations:
(c) no extettsion of the NATO "area". but provision to be made for transatlantic consultations
ott all "out-of-area" matters deemed to be of cornrnon interest on a case-b)'-case basis and with
no obl igations attached.
(f) more extensive dialogue within the Alliance on the threat posed by rveapons of mass de-
struction:
/g/ complete evaluation of the future risks and threats in the field of weapons of ntass destruc-
tion and assesslnent of their implications for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.
(h) making it clear that. as a rnatter of principle. the use of out-of-area fbrce in the framervork
of NATO or other nrilitary action must be founded on a specific mandate from the United
Nations or the OSCE, save in exceptional cases of humanitarian disasters or serious violations
of hurrran rishts:
/ii deepening NATO-WE,U cooperation in order to promote the development of the ESDI
rvitltin NATO. in particular by the conclusion. prior to the Washinstou Summit, of a framervork
agreernent on the use by WEU of NATO assets and capabilities;
(j/ making clear to "non-WEU" allies that the development of the ESDI within NATO is not
enough to give the European Union the "capacitv fbr autonomous action" called for in the Saint
Malo Franco-British Declaration:
(fu gainitg general acceptance among the Allies for a declaration on the ESDI to complete the
Berlin Declaration (1996) so as to allou'Europe (European Union or WEU). in times of crisis.
to take a decision outside the NATO frarrervork on the measures, including militarl,measures,
to be taken:
(l) calling. in orderto guarantee tlre autonoml of a European chain of command u,ithin NATO.
forthe appointtnent of a general in charge of managing the E,uropean pillar within the Alliance
in normal times. and for the designation of a dedicated military, staff:
(m)taking nteasures in order to establish. for WEU-led operations. a chain of commaud within
the E,r,rropean pillar of NATO, avoiding the designation of Deputl' SACEUR as Operations
Commander.
Oil supporting the idea of extensive membership of the Alliance based on an analysis of its
long-term strategic and general interests and on enharrcernent of or,erall European stability;
/o/ helping countries aspiring to join the Alliance by setting up uith them rnajor cooperation
programr.nes in the frarneu,ork of the Paftnership for Peace:
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(p) continuing to develop relations rvith Russia and Ukraine in order to involve those major
countries in decisions on which the stability of the European security area depends:
/g/ ensuring that there is no reduction in parliamentary scrutiny and liaison betu'een national
parliarnents in the arrangelnents for European security and defence;
2. Formalise, with a vierv to achieving full transparency' in transatlantic relations. the present
WEU Council's regular contacts or those of its equivalent in the future with the United States and
Canadian representatives in Brussels.
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Exp lanilor1, Me morond um
(submitted bv ilIr Co-r, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is
making preparations to celebrate its 5Oth anni-
versary in Washington from 23 to 25 April
I 999.
2. This uill be an occasion for the Alliance
to defiue for itself a new Strategic Concept
adapted to the changes which have taken place
in the international environment since the fall of
the Berlin wall.
3. The document published on this occasion
rvill form the framework for the "nerv Alliance"
which our American allies have in mirrd for the
2 I st century.
4. The United States' ambition is to make
NATO a major player on the world stage under
American leadership. The Europeans. for their
part, must bear in mind a number of key prin-
ciples in order to preserve the Alliance's Euro-
pean mission of collective defence and its role
of guardian of the transatlantic link, rvhile al-
lo* ing the emergence of a European Security
and Defence Identity' (ESDI) rvhich can provide
E,uropeans uith "a capacity' for autonomous ac-
tion. backed up b)' credible military' forces" in
order to supporl the E,uropean Union's Common
Foreign and Security Policy, as clearly stated in
the Saint Malo Franco-British declaratiou.
5. The agenda of the Washington Surnmit
has been drawn up. Numerous communiquds
and other documents have been published in the
press, particularly at the time of NATO's last
ministerial meeting in December 1998, frorn
rvhich it emerges that current discussions
among the Alliance partners are focusing on the
following issues:
the new Strategic Concept. for rvhich
the aim essentially is to define the Al-
liance's "core functions", acknowled-
ging its role of responding to crises
uhich affect the general interest, to re-
call its nuclear strategy and to find a
formula rvith regard to the [,N man-
date which ma1' be required fbr any
rnilitary intervention:
the European Security and Defence
Identity'. the implementation of rvhich
rnust be considered uithin. but pos-
sibly'also. outside the Alliance;
a cornmon operational vision, in order
to define the military capabilities re-
quired to perfonn Alliance tasks as
thel' arise out of the new Strategic
Concept, and the ways and rneans of
acquiring such capabilities, ,rr hich
raises the question of cooperatiorr
among defence industries;
the threats rvhich must be considered:
weapons of mass destruction and even
terrorism and drug trafficking:
finally, everything concerning rela-
tions rvith eastern European countries:
the Partnership for Peace and specific
relations with Russia and Ukraine.
II. Questiorts for discttssion
at lhe W'oshington Summit
l. The new Strategic Conc'epl
6. The Strategic Concept. along with the
Washington Treaty' itself, is one of the funda-
mental texts of the Alliance. It has a dual func-
tion: to explain NATO's tasks to the public at
large and to lay' down guidelines providing a
rvorking framervork for the civilian and military
authorities of the Alliance.
1. The current concept was adopted in 1991.
following the fall of the Berlin wall. As a result
of the fuudamental changes that have affected
the geostrategic environment since that date. it
was decided by the Heads of State and of Gor,-
ernment, meeting in Madrid in Jul1, 1997, to
rvork out a new Strategic Concept in time for
the next summit in Washington.
8. These nerv circumstances 
- 
the develop-
ments in central European countries and Russia
and in the field of the CFSP. the emergence of
nerv risks for the stability' of E,urope * and the
changes set in motion within tlre Alliance 
- 
en-
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largement. crisis-management missions. orgarri-
sation of the ESDI. refbrnr of the cornmand
structure 
- 
have prompted the call fiom the
United States to redef-ine NATO's role as a
major player on the intenrational stage. Indeed.
for the Americans this is the main airn of the
Washington Surnmit.
l.l. Core futtclions: collective defence
ond non-,4rlicle 5 crisis response
9. In practical terms. the first issue that is
currently bcing debated is that of the Alliance's
core fiurctions. The question is whether the
mer.nbers of the Alliance rl'ill decide to redefine
its scope and core functions to include. in addi-
tion to the "collective defence" of its members.
peace-keeping and crisis-response missions in
def'ence of the common interests of the Alliance
partners, as proposed by the United States.
10. Man1, European countries corrsider it irr-
portant to drarv a clear distinction bet*'een col-
lective defence and crisis rnanagement. Thel
see them as different kinds of task uhich cannot
be trouped toqether on an equal footing as core
functions of the Alliarrcc. While collectir,e de-
fence is a mutual obligation arising out of Aft-
icle 5 of the Washington Treaty, states hal'e the
sovereign right to decide whether to participate
in crisis-rnanagement missions. Here the prin-
ciple of self-defence. uhich must rlot be treated
as a catch-all notion, does uot apply.
I I . The British Secretary' of State for Foreign
Afthirs. Mr Cook. rnade this point quite clear at
the NATO ministerial meeting of 8 Decernber
I 998:
"NATO nrust retain the flexibility to re-
spond to the real problems rr'e recognise
as real challenges to our securitl . But
equally'. of course. that cannot be a purelv
open-ended comrnitnrent 
- 
\\,e cannot
have an Lrnlimited comrnitrnent for
NATO".
12. This also raises the question of the geo-
graphic boundaries for NATO involvement in
crises outside E,urope. as currently' defined b1'
Article 6 of the Waslrington Treaty. The solu-
tion ilill probably' be to adopt a principle of
consultation roughh' sinrilar to that of Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty'. The mem-
bers of tlre Alliance. anxious not to lirnit their
olrn freedorn of decision. rlill not wish to make
an obligation out of such consultations. More-
over some states. in parlicu lar France. are
against extending NATO's responsibilities to
include the Middle East and Africa. It appears
to be difficult to do arva1, rvith the principle of
such consultations altogether. but it should not
be tied to precise obligations.
1.2. Nucleur strulegt,
13. When NATO adopted its Strategic Con-
cept in Rome in 1991, setting out its cllrrent
nuclear strateg\. the nuclear arsenal was charac-
terised as a "last resoft" intended to deter a po-
tcntial aggressor from using weapons of mass
destruction (nuclear. biological or chenrical
weapons). First use of nuclear \l'eapons rvas not
ruled out b1, the members of the Alliance.
1-1. Until last autumn there uas no question
arnong the Alliance partners of der, iating from
this doctrine. to rvhich NATO's three nuclear
po\\,ers are particularll attached.
15. A debate was sparked off last November
bl German Foreign Aftairs Minister Joschka
Fischer. when he made a statement challenging.
in the long term. the very existeuce of nuclear
\\eapons. but calling in the immediate future for
NATO to adopt a "no-first-lrse" doctrine.
16. Shortll afier. on the occasion of a visit to
Washington. German Defence Minister Rudolf
Scharpine qualified that statement, explaining
that this uas only a long-ternt airn of the Ger-
rlan Gorenrmeut. During a joint press confer-
encc-. however. US Def-ense Secretary' Willianr
Cohen left no doubt about the American posi-
tion:
"l made it clear that the USA opposes any
chauge in this polic-v" because ue believe
the current doctrine serves to preserve the
peace and enhance deterrence. In particu-
lar. the Alliance's nuclear fbrces continue
to fulfil an esseutial role b1, ensuring un-
cerlainty' in the mind of any aggressor
about the nature of the Allies' response to
nrilitary aggression. and because the
strategv cor.rtinues to sen'e NATO's in-
terests. there is no reason to consider
changing it".
Furthermore, during recent meetings, the nu-
clear porvers have pointed to a huge reduction
over the past ten 1'ears in the number of nuclear
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warheads in ELrrope, and to the impressive arse-
nal which remains in Russia.
17. Finally. during a colloqul' held on 6-7
Februarl' 1999 in MLrnich, the German Chancel-
lor stated that he continued to defend the uotiorr
of ''uo-first-use", while accepting that there uas
ver)'little likelihood of this becoming the
NATO doctrine.
18. One can deduce fronr all this that NATO
n ill not change its nuclear posture at the
Washington Sunrnrit. lt rvould not. iu auy case,
be in Errrope's interests to oppose its major
Americau alll'on this point since, for the United
States, the Alliance's nuclear strategy, as it
starrds at present. is a sine qua ttott for Anterican
involvenrent in Europe's defence.
1.3. The question of mandutes (UN, OSCE)
19. The United States' rvish to redefine the
Alliance's role among the international institu-
tions *as expressed in the "T'riple Crown" con-
cept. rvhich has the aim of integrating European
aud transatlantic orgauisations (NATO. the EU
and the OSCE) in a new Euro-Atlantic s1'stem
in which the tasks of each organisation would
be clearly,delirnited. Under such a system.
NATO u ould defend security interests, the
European Union uould be responsible for pro-
moting prosperity. while the OSCE w'ould stand
up fbr hurnan rights and democratic values. The
OSCE would be the organisation responsible for
ironing or.rt differences before thev degenerated
into open conflict and for the reconstrLrction of
civil society' in the aftermath of an armed con-
flict.
20. The European desire to see the Union
develop a Common Foreign and Securitl, Policy
supported by "a capacity for autonomous action.
backed up by' credible military forces" (Saint
Nlalo declaration) does not seem to be com-
patible with the Triple Crown concept.
21. Another question arising in this debate
concerns the legal basis for NATO peacekeep-
ing operations. The United States wants rec-
ognition of NATO's right to take action on its
ou'n initiatil'e, rvhile some E,uropean countries
stress the need for an explicit UN Security
Council mandate.
22. Last December, French Foreign Affairs
Minister Hubeft Vddrine insisted that missions
calling for the use of force should be placed un-
der the authority' of the United Nations. rvhile
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as-
sefted that. although NATO would continue to
act in compliance witlr the UN Charter. the Al-
liance must hal'e the right. on a "case-b\'-case"
basis. to take actiou rvithor-rt the authorisation of
the Securitv Council.
23. The United States uould like to general-
ise the approach adopted rccenth, by the North
Atlantic CoLrncil in the Kosovo crisis. when it
decided to threaten Belgrade rvith punitive air
strikes rvithout a rnandate frorn the UN Securitv
Council. rvlrile the German Foreign Affairs
Minister. Mr Fischer. made it clear that such
tactics ma1, onll' be used in exceptional circum-
stances.
24. Chancellor Schroder made Germanl,'s
position clear at the conf'erence held in Munich
on 6 February 1999:
"But the readiuess to assuure more re-
sponsibility also means that iuternational.
out-of-area military missions must be
based on an unequivocal mandate under
intenrational lari'. As a rule. this rvould be
a mandate from the UN Security CoLrncil
or action under the aegis of the OSCE. A
cornrnunitv deflned by values, such as our
transatlantic Alliance. cannot afford to be
complacent on this issue. This principle
ma1' only be abandoned in exceptional
cases: to prevent humanitarian catastro-
phes and srave violationsof human rights.
i.e. uheu irnmediate action is urgently
called for on humanitarian grounds."
L4. Tlrc Europeun Security aud Defence ldentitl,
25. The development of the European Secu-
rity and Defence Identity within the Alliance
u'as given neu' impetus by the Berlin Declara-
tion of June 1996. I-louever, difflcult negotia-
tions *ere required for the mernbers of the Alli-
ance to reach agreerneut on this issue. The posi-
tion of the United States rvas reflected in a dip-
lomatic telegrarn sent by the American Ambas-
sador Reginald Bartholome\\', rvhich was re-
cently qLroted in an Assernbly' report on "New
prospects for transatlantic cooperation in secu-
rity and defence" (subntitted bl Mr Blaaurv on
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9November 1998). The concerns expressed at
that time can be sumrned up as fbllou's.
" (...) efforts to constnrct a E,uropean
pillar by' redefining and limiting
NATO's role. b1'ueakening its struc-
ture. or b1, creating a rnonolithic bloc
of certain members rvould be mis-
guided (...)":
"(...) we are concerned over the pro-
posals that W'EU should be subordi-
nated to the European Council"l
"(..) it u,ould accentuate the separa-
tron and independence of the Euro-
pean pillar fronr the Alliance":
"Such an arrangement could give not.t-
NATO nrembcrs a voice in the NATO
CoLrncil via the WEU":
"The rel'erse rr'ould also tend to be the
case 
- 
that NATO uould assunre an
irnplicit or indirect securitl cornmit-
ment through European Council influ-
ence o\er WEU for states ivhich,
rihile not NATO merlbers. rv'ere part
of the European Union and might call
upon S'EU forces."
26. 'l'he Berlin Declaration can thus be con-
sidered as an imporlant step forward for the
concept of thc E,uropean Securitv and Defence
Identity. since all the urembers of the Alliance
agreed on the possihility of operations being
conducted "tordar the politiccrl curlrol arrd
strutegic direcliorr ry' W'EL'".
2l . The1, stipulated that such \\'ELI-led op-
erations would be fbunded ou three principles:
- 
prior identificution of the NATO as-
sets and capabilities 
- 
in particular the
HQs. HQ elements and cornr.nand
positions 
- 
that uould be urade avail-
able to the Europeaus:
e loboratiou oJ Europeou corrtntortd ur-
rungeDtenls for couducting WEU-led
operations. This principle irnplies des-
ignating and traininc appropriate per-
sonnel 
- 
the E,uropean elements within
the HQs 
- 
uho rvould perform a dual
function ("double-hatting")1
- 
peuc'etinta plotltittgl tntd trummg irt re-
spect of the different assets and ca-
pabilities in order to ensure that they
function effectively' as a coherent mili-
tan'w'hole.
28. These principles are in the process of be-
ing implernented within the Alliance and rela-
tions betueen NATO and WEU have evoh'ed
considerabll'orer the past trlo years. There are
a nurnber of oLrtstanding issues. as rvill be seen
fionr the detailed presentation of these points in
the reler'ant section of this repoft. but overall
the situation is satisfactory' and it can be said
that a form of the European Security and De-
fence Identitl has emerged within the Alliance
for WEU-led operatious using NATO assets.
29. AII recent contacts with the American
authorities would seern to indicate that the
United States does not wish the European Union
to become the pole of attraction for the concept
of the European Security and Defence Identitl'.
Rather, they insist on the need for WEU to
maintain its decision-nraking autonomv and
rvish to avoid the formation of a European
LJnion bloc rvithin the Alliance which would
constitute a de facto European caucus. The
Americans reluctantll' aqreed to the der,'elop-
ment of the ESDI on the essential condition that
it bc formed solell' uithin the Alliance. More-
over. thel' are opposed to an) automatic proce-
dr.rre fbr making NATO assets available to
WEU.
30. Wlren questioned about the recent Saint
Malo Franco-British declaration. the American
representatives highlighted the necessarily' pro-
gressile nature of any' transfer of WEU tirnc-
tions to the EU and the pitfalls to be avoided. as
summed up by' Madeleine Albright's "3 Ds"r:
"No decoupling. duplication or discrirnination":
firstly, NATO is the essential em-
bodiment of the transatlantic link and
must rernain an or_ganisation of sover-
eign allies. This rneans that decisions
by' its European mernbers should not
be taken in adr'ance. in a u,ider frame-
uork (in other rrords. no European
caucus):
secondly', there must be no duplication
of rrrilitary' structlrres for the planning
t0
' A,ti.l. inthe Finunctal Trnes of 7 December 1998
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and conduct of operations and pro-
curement of military equipment:
finally, it is not acceptable that there
should be discrimination towards
those Alliance metnbers rvhich are not
members of the European Union.
Provided that these conditions are met,
the United States declares itself ready to
discuss with the Europeans how to
strengthen Europe's capacity for action.
31. The Arnerican attitude shorvs above all a
desire to see Europe assuming greater respon-
sibilities rvithin the Alliance by shouldering a
bigger share of the European defence burden,
which means increasing, or at least rationalis-
ing. its defence spending, in order to make more
efficient use of resources.
32. The Americans consider that the consul-
tation process in the event of a crisis should
continue to take place within the Alliance
framework. and that the Europeans can only
decide to take action on their own if there are no
formal objections on the part of the United
States. They take the view that under this ar-
rangement a European-led operatiot-t using
NATO assets can always be envisaged. and that
such an operation rvould require only limited
"military expertise" rvithin the EU, such as that
currently available uithin the WE,U Military
Staff through the "double-hatted" NATO-WEU
rnilitary delegates.
33. When questioned about the rules rvhich
they would apply in response to European re-
quests to use NATO. or even specifically'Amer-
ican, military assets, the Americans told your
Rapporteur that the decisions rvould be taken on
a case-by-case basis, in the same conditions as
tlrose that apply to an od hoc coalition or to an)'
such request made to the United States by a
member of the Alliance, and that there lvas
therefore no need to set up a specificallv Euro-
pean structure for that purpose.
31. In practice. today' it is the creation of a
chain of European comrnands in NATO en-
abling Europeans 
- 
in cases where the Ameri-
cans do not wish to be involved 
- 
to take action
on their orvn. backed up by NATO forces and
assets, that constitutes the European iderttity
within the Alliance. Br-rt the effect of such a so-
lution will merely be to consolidate the United
States' dominant position in NATO: unless
there is an adequate European identity outside
NATO. there cannot be a proper European
identity within the Alliance. The main effect of
the latter will be to make any European actiott
subordinate to a prior decision by NATO, rvhich
*ould have the opposite effect of what the
Europeans are seeking, since it rvould give the
United States the possibility of making NATO
act under the aLrthority of the Americans with-
out their actLrally taking parl in any sLtch action.
rvhile the Europeans rvould find themselves in a
situation in ivhich action without US support
rvould prove impossible. It is worth noting that
although the Freuch insisted that American
troops. albeit ferv in number. should be subordi-
nate to the command NATO conferred upon the
French in FYROM. rvith a vierv to being able to
extract OSCE nronitors from Kosovo if neces-
sary, their purpose was to avoid giving any int-
pression that action taken by Europe on the
ground was following a policy laid dorvn by the
United States.
35. Moreover. even if we accept that our
American allies are genuine about their willing-
ness to see NATO assets and capabilities being
loaned to WEU. they have nonetheless raised
the issue. as \!'as confirmed at the NATO/WEU
crisis-management seminar held on 3 February
1999. ofcontrolling the use of such assets dur-
ing a crisis. They' in tact u'ant the NATO staffs
to be responsible for planning the use of these
assets, which would subject such planning to the
approval of the North Atlantic Council. Where,
under such circumstances, is Europe's auton-
omy for an operation w'hich is supposed to be
conducted under the "political control and stra-
tegic direction of WEU"?
36. Finally, it has to be adrnitted that there is
linle chance of the European tnembers of
NATO reaching agreement on joint initiatives in
rrhich the Americans rvould not participate. and
for the moment such "WEU-led" operations rvill
remain rare. The European identity, thus per-
ceived as being exclusively rvithin NATO, can
hardly be any'thing rnore than an ocl hoc coali-
tion that will have to be formed on a case-by-
case basis. as for Bosnia and Kosovo. This
rvould by no means be sufficient. since such an
"ESDI" could not develop into a permanent
il
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institution which could redress the balance in
the Alliance.
31 . In conclusion. \\e ma) hal'e serious
doubts as to rvhether an ESDI rvithin NATO
rvould enable Europe to realise its lesitinrate
arnbition of E,uropean autonont\ in tlre fic-ld of
def'ence. C learll . the European structure in
char-ue of militarl mafters. rrhich at the urornent
is 'W'EU. must have a militarl staff. situation-
nrouitoring centre and plannine cell in order to
pror ide a minimum level of autonom)' for as-
sessing the situation and choosing the military
options in tirnes of crisis. This. horvever. is not
enough: to be credible in the field of the CFSP,
Europe must have a uenuinell' autonolnous
militarv tool comprising a chain of cornmaud.
and hence an operations F{Q and force HQs
rvhich r.r,ould not depetrd ou the approval of a
non-European countrv. The ESDI must develop
outside the Alliance. in parallel to its develop-
ment rvithin NATO.
2. The conttnon operational vision
2. l. Developntenl of contmon operationul capabilities
i8. Another US goal for the summit is agree-
rrent on a defence capabilities initiative: "The
ainr is to match capabilities to the ltew re-
quirernents b1' agreeing on a colnmon concept
of operations that prepares the Allies for the
21st centurl battlefreld in rvhich mastery of new
techrrologies u'ill be critical to success"i.
"Our goal is to enhance Allied capabili-
ties: most Allied nations do not need to
spend nrore but just to spend more
u ise11".
39. The problems facing the Alliance in con-
nection rvith the preparation ol fbrces tbr
NATO missions rvere pinpointed b1 M. R. Laird
in De-fense y'y'eus3:
"... For the United States. there is a strong
belief the core challenge is to build forces
for high-intensi[ u'arfare around new
technologies. The US definition of the
revolution in rnilitary' affairs (RMA) fo-
clrses upon the development of a global
r Statement bv the Anrerican Ambassador to NATO in
an address to the North Atlantic Assemblv.
3 Defensc N'euls. 30 November 1998.
force appropriate for a u ide l'ariety of
missions.
Interdependence with allied forces is de-
fined in terms of hou,Allies can plug into
an overall Americau architecture.
America's Joint Vision 2010 drau's to-
gether a number of kel treuds 
- 
donrinant
manoeLr\ re. precision engagement. fo-
cLrsed logistics, full-dimension protection
and inforrnation superiority 
- 
to give thejoint lorces full-spectrurn dominance in
peacetirne engagements. deterrence and
conf-lict prevention.
It is the capability' to blend various neu
tecltnologies into broad-spectrum domi-
nance. rvhich is the goal of the RMA.
For most Europeans. such a goal simpll
is out of reach. Europeans sa)' peace-
keeping and expeditionarv warfare are the
dominant requirentents fbr the period
ahead. not full-spectrurrn dominance in
h i gh- intensitr, *'arfare.
Even more telling. European strategists
sa1, the forces most relel'ant to peace-
keeping and expeditionary u'arfare are
not those bLrilt for high-intensitl, rvarfare.
This does not rnean Europeans are not
seeking to enhance joint or coalition cap-
abilitres. Rather. the desire is to enhauce
tuseful joint or coalition capabilities rvith-
in a peacekeeping or expeditionary war-
f'are contert.
The United States must not confirse fail-
ure to plug into its sl'sterns w'ith the fail-
ure to innovate. E,uropeans clearlt'are
interested in pursuinu national and coali-
tion efforts 
- 
European as rvell as transat-
lantic 
- 
to provide for specralised cap-
abilities rvhere possible. Choices avail-
able from current trends include .
Britain and France could del,elop joint
maritime strike forcesl
France. the United States and Britain
could coordinate cruise missile strikes
against targets threatening to their
v ital national interests:
- 
European ann)' cells could be linked
r,ia information and cornmunication
12
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systems into a connected joint force
for peacekeeping operationsl
the Eurosam Sol-,4ir lllol'erute-Portde/
Terre (SAMP) variant of the Medium
Extended Air Defence System to be
deplol'ed early' next century could pro-
vide significant protection against bal-
listic missiles for European expedit-
ionarl,forces.
The key' states in Western Europe all have
adopted fbrce mobilitl, and power projec-
tion as the neu rnotif fbr the transforma-
tion of their militaries. But a European
RMA supporting force mobility and
po\ler projection uill be different from
that pLrrsued by the United States.
(...) The Alliance faces the challenge of
cornbining American and European ef-
forts for strategic redesign. not simply
fitting European militaries into the Anter-
ican rnodel. Meeting such a challengc re-
quires considerable eflbrt, understanding
and patience on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.".
2.2. Cooperalion among defence industries
40. The so-called "dcfence capabilities ini-
tiative" proposed by LIS Defense Secretary
William Cohen is intended to create a stronger
and rnore effective Alliance by focusing on
more efficient defence equiprnent spending and
inrproved forces interoperabilitl. to be achieved
by means of coordination. or even standardisa-
tion of the defence procurement policies of Al-
liance partners and enhanced industrial coop-
eration arnong them.
41. Indeed. recent developments on the E,uro-
pean defence industry scene shou' that the airn
of most European countries is to consolidate
their industrial capacity, with a view to achiev-
ing strategic autonomy and a critical mass in
order to build for thentselves au economicallv
viable future. Such mergers will have a positive
impact on costs and E,uropeau-level standardi-
sation.
42. Thus the Anterican proposals must be
giveu cautious consideration in the light of these
principles. A point wofth noting is that Euro-
pean companies can normalll, achieve the in-
teroperability rvhich is so essential. by comply-
ing with NATO standardisation asreements
(STANAG) which are regularlv Lrpdated b1 the
Alliance, provided that all the members of the
Alliance apply thern scrupulously.
-+3. It should be recalled that in their Declar-
ation on Western European Union appended to
the Amsterdam Treaty. the E,uropean countries
specified that WEU. through the Western Euro-
pean Armameuts Organisation (WEAO) and
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG),
is the framenork that has been chosen for the
implementation of this European arrnaments co-
operation policy.
3. The new lhreuts: weupotts of mass destruction,
lerrorism and drugs
44. In an article in the Financiul Tintes in
December 1998. Madeleine Albright explained
US policy'ivith regard to nuclear, biological and
chemical weapolls:
-'One challenge iu particular the Wash-
ington Summit must address is the verl'
real threat to our people. our territory'. and
our military' forces posed by weapons of
mass destruction and their means of de-
lil'er1'. We must improve overall Alliance
efforts both to stent prolif'eration and to
deter. preveut and protect against such
attacks. NATO's etforts should comple-
ment. not supplant, the existing regimes
and effbrts under rval to control prolif-
eration."
45. For this pLlrpose. the Americans have
proposed to the Allies a global initiative on
weapor.rs of mass destruction uith a view to set-
ting u.p a- joint "center for ll'eapons of mass de-
structrorr '':
"The center will be a clearinghouse for
increased intelligence-sharing b1' W'ash-
ington intended to produce a more unitred
assessment of the threats posed both by'
states like Iran or lraq and 'non-state ac-
tors'. like terrorist groups of the kind led
by Osama bin Laden.
But the Americans are also pushing great-
er Alliance collaboration to deter wea-
pons of mass destnrction and to defend
allied populations and territory against
t3
a Herultl Trtbtrna. J December 1998.
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them. Proposals include Alliance vac-
cines, advanced protective outfits for the
military, detective equipment and other
collaborative research and development.
so each countr)' of the Alliance does not
have to bear the cost of covering every
contingency' on its own."
16. This has, hou'ever. triggered a broad de-
bate on u,hat NATO's stance should be rvith
regard to such \!eapons, for the European Alli-
ance partners bl' no means unanimously support
the American proposal. Some consider that it
entails a risk of turning the Alliance into a col-
lective securitl, organisation in the broad sense
of the term. rvith terms of reference that have
been enlarged to include non-rnilitary threats.
17. Indeed. Mrs Albright's reference in a
memorandum to the American Ambassadors to
a development of the role of the Alliance to-
rvards a "broader concept of the defense of our
common interests" has giverr rise to concern
among some Alliance members that thel'rvill be
involved. through the effbrls to combat this type
of rveaponrl. in US policf in the Middle East,
and that NATO rvill find itself combating terror-
isrn or even international crime, therebv running
the risk of conrpeting ri'ith other international
organisations uhich have more cornpetence in
these areas.
4. Enlargentenl of the .4lliunce ond
lhe Parlnersh ip for Peace
18. Arnong the issues on the agenda of the
Washington Surnrnit. the qLrestion of enlarge-
ment is extrernely' sensitive in that NATO mern-
bership is a cherished goal fbr manl potential
candidates currentll' associated u ith WEU
through several categories of status rvhich the1,
value highly as they enable thern to take part in
the WEU Council meetings held everl fortnight
in Brussels and thus involr,'e thern in the devel-
opnlent of the European Security' and Defence
Identity.
19. In the Madrid Declaration. issued at the
close of the JLrll' 1997 NATO Summit. the AI-
Iies defined a \,'erv open policy on enlargement.
ftrrrrally inviting three countries to begin ac-
cessior.r talks and aftirrning the follorving:
"... NATO remains open to new members
under Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. The Alliance wilI continue to
welcome new members in a position to
further the principles of the Treaty' and
contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic
area. The Alliance expects to extend fur-
ther invitations in coming years to nations
willing and able to assume the responsi-
bilities and obligations of rnembership,
and as NATO determines that the inclu-
sion of these nations would serve the
overall political and strategic interests of
the Alliance and that the inclusion would
enhance overall European security and
stability."
50. In accordance with these intentions. a
first group of countries 
- 
the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland 
- 
joined the Alliance verl'
recently (March 1999) and. similarly to Iceland.
Nonray and Turkey, have acquired associate
member status in WEU. In the opinion of mem-
bers of the NATO Secretariat-General. the Al-
lies will leave the door open in Washington but
there is unlikely to be any' specific invitation to
a particular candidate.
51. Horvever. all applicant countries must be
encouraged to prepare for accession to the Alli-
ance. They need help. in particular in setting Lrp
programrnes designed to make their forces iu-
teroperable rvith those of NATO and drarvn up
in close consultation ivith NATO in the frame-
work of the Paftnership for Peace. An extensive
list of applications must therefore be left open
uith a vie* to turther enlargement, rvithout
seeking to specity any candidates by name for
the tirne being.
52. Furthermore, all the observer and asso-
ciate paftner countries rnust continue to be iu-
volved rvithin WEU in the development of the
European Security and Defence Identitl'. in par-
ticular by allowing their full participation in all
tlre seminars and crisis-management e\ercises
planned in the WEU franrework.
5. Russia and L'kraine
53. NATO's relations with Russia and
Ukraine have considerably evolved in recent
)ears. in particular since the adoption of the
fundamental texts of 1991 .
54. The Foundrng Act on lv[utuol Relatiotrs,
Cooperuliort entd ,Secm'ifi' behreen N-,17O ttnd
lhe Rtrssictrt Fedcrution, signed in Paris ot't 2J
14
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May 1997, opened a new era in European se-
curity relations by providing a frameu'ork for
cooperation between NATO and RLrssia. The
NATO-Russia Joint Permanent CoLrncil estab-
lished under the Founding Act holds regular
meetings, giving full satisfhction to all sides.
Indeed. these regular talks at the level of the
Ambassadors to NATO provide an opportunitl'
to clarifl' and enhance uuderstanding for the
different positions. They have been particularly
useful in providing a forum tbr the parties to
consult each other on the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Kosol'o crisis.
55. The 1/lTO-Ltkrume Chorter signed in
JLrly 1997 formalised ties with Ukraine by de-
veloping practical cooperation in the framervork
of the Partnership for Peace and strengthening
political cooperation. Ukraine has made a rnajor
efforl to establish permanent relations u'ith
NATO, as can be seen from its "State pro-
gramme for cooperation with NATO Lrntil the
year 2000". the setting-up of a NATO informa-
tion centre in Kiev and the presence in that city
of two NATO liaison officers.
6. Conclusiotts: Irttpliculions of
lhe ll'ushinglon Summit for Europe
56. The Washington Summit will be of major
importance fbr Europe. giverr that the develop-
ment of the European Security and Defence
Identity'rvill depend on horv much room for ini-
tiative is left for Europe in the Alliance's new
Strategic Concept.
51. The Llnited States' rvish to globalise se-
curity and defence issues could ruln counter to
E,uropean interests. Indeed, if NATO u'ere to be
transformed into the "u'orld's policemau" under
American leadership. this would leave little
roorn for the development u,ithin the EU of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy founded
on specifically European interests. Europe must
ahvays have the possibility of dealing r,''ith cri-
sis management within its orvn institutions and
must have at its disposal a genuinely autono-
mous military tool. enabling it to intervene if it
so decides.
58. The European Union is. of course, the
organisation around u,hich a true European
identity is emerging. The creation of a single
currency rvill be a powerful force for cohesion,
leading to the development of a common policy'
in numerous areas. This process u'ill lead to a
situation in rvhich Europe's specific interests
will become more clearly demarcated from
those of the western world in general.
59. When embarking on the prelirninary' ne-
gotiations in the run-up to the Washington
Summit. Europe shoLrld bear in rnind the follorv-
ing major principles:
it must decide whether it wishes to
live in a nrono-polar world witli the
United States at its centre. or. on the
contrarl,, to become a major player in
a multi-polar uorld uhich is inde-
pendent of American hegemonyt
the ESDI must gil'e Europe a genu-
inely autonomous capacitl for actiou
in the field of crisis lnanagelxent:
European participation in NATO op-
erations will not always be suff-icierrt;
the ESDI must be developed botlr
rvithin and outside the Alliance in or-
der to give rise to a specifically Euro-
pean defence capability. This means
that some duplication of military staffs
u,ill have to be accepted so that
Europe can have its orvr.r, autonomous
chain of command.
the ESDI must take account of the in-
terests ofthose central European coun-
tries'which rlill not benefit from
NATO's eastu'ards enlargement:
Europeans must rernain arvare that
other international organisations (UN.
OSCE. EU. WEU). rvhich ntal'have a
broader rnembership than NATO. riill
be in a better position than the Alli-
ance to deal with certain securitv is-
SUES.
60. For all these reasons, Europeans should
adopt an e.rtremell,cautious attitude lvith regard
to some of the issues which will be tackled in
Washington and should:
recall that the only core function
promptir)!t an autornatic response is
that of collective defence:
not accept the notion of extending
NATO's geographic limits. except for
the purpose of consultations. in order
l5
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to avoid being dragged into out-of-
area operations alougside the Ameri-
cans.
obtain clarification on the notion of
'-common interests". rvhich is much
too vague:
adopt the German position on the issue
of mandates. recalling the need for UN
authoritl' for any use of force. except
iu erceptional cases fbr humanitarian
purposes:
promote the development of the ESDI
within the Alliance, u'hile making it
clear that it must also develop outside
NATO:
not accept the prograrnme for stan-
dardising operational capabilities pro-
posed by' the Americans. but rather
insist on the need for interoperability
of rveapons s)'stems. nhich u'ill be
considerably improred thanks to the
restructuring under u'av in European
armaments industries:
accept cooperation in the field of in-
formation ou \\'eapons of mass de-
stnrction. but not the involvernent of
the Alliance in non-military issues
sLrch as combating terrorism or drugs
tratfickins.
III. Implementution of the ESDI
within the Alliunce
L Reminder of the decisions taken bt'
the L'Iinisterial Council in Berlin (1996)
61. The objective of developing the European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the
Alliance was clearly'expressed in the final com-
muniqud issLred follorving the ntinisterial meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council. rneeting in
Berlin in June 1996:
"this identiry, rvill (...) permit the creation
of militarill coherent and effective forces
capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of WEU".
62. Furthermore, this communiqu6 lays dorvn
three guiding principles for the implementation
of the ESDI:
prior identif-ication of the NATO as-
sets and capabilities 
- 
in particr:lar the
HQs, HQ elements and comr.nand
positions 
- 
that rvould be made avail-
able to the E,uropeans:
elaboration of European command ar-
rangements for conducting WEU-led
operations. This principle implies des-
ignating and training appropriate per-
sonnel 
- 
the E,uropean elements rvithin
the HQs 
- 
uho would perform a dual
function ("double-hatting"):
peacetime planning and training in re-
spect of the dift-erent assets and cap-
abilities iu order to ensure that they
function effectively'as a coherent mili-
tary'whole.
2. W'Ea/lY.ATO cortsu ltation procedures
63. The implenrentation of the ESDI calls for
a considerable amount of u,ork to be done in
cornmon by'NATO and WEU. to prepare coop-
eration both in normal times and in tirnes of
crisis. Since June 1996. the tuo organisations
have been making major efforts to consult each
other in this treld:
in normal times, regular joint meetings
are held at various lel'els betrveen the
relevant bodies of the tr.l'o organisa-
tions: the t*o Councils. the WEU
Council Working Group and NATO's
Political Committee (PC) etc. On the
military' side. there are regular joint
meetings between NATO's Militarl,
Committee in permanent session and
WEU's Military Delesates Group. as
well as frequent meetings betu,een the
military staffs of the tuo organisations
(NATO's lnternational Military, Staff
and WEU's Militarl, Staffl;
furthermore, a reciprocal agreement
has been concluded bet*een WEU and
NATO with regard to participation b1,
the Chairmen of the NATO Military
Cornrnittee and the WEU Military'
Delegates Group iu certain meetings
of each other's committee. This recip-
rocal arrangement will provide an op-
portunity' to observe and comment on
iterns of interest to both organisations,
including, inter olio, those aspects of
16
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CJTF implementation which affect
NATO-WEU cooperation and any
other point which. by nature. is rele-
vant to both WELI and NATO. More-
over. this arrangernent will ensure that
decisions of common military' interest
will be taken bl each organisation in
full knowledge of the state of play in
the other organisation, most irnpor-
tantl1,, during crises and operations;
in the case of an emerging crisis, the
plan is tbr l'arious rvorking groups of
the tu'o orsanisations to jointly assess
the situation and prepare military op-
tious. Moreover, it ma1' be decided to
convene additional joint meetings of
the relevant bodies:
at the level of the CHODs:
WEU's CoLrncil Working Group
arid NATO's Political Comrnit-
tee (PC);
WEU's Politico-Military Croup
and NATO's Policy Coordina-
tion Gror.rp (PCG,TTTJATO):
the WEU Military' Delegates
Gror"rp and the NATO Military'
Cornnr ittee in perrnanent ses-
sion:
the tr'EU Military' Staff and the
NATO lnternational Militarl,
Staff:
the WEU Planning Cell and the
NATO Combined Joint Plan-
ning Staff-.
61. A NATO/WEU joint document is cur-
rently' under preparation. rihile the WEU docu-
ment on crisis-managernerlt mechanisrns and
procedures, which is regularly updated. clearll'
deflnes the areas and arrangements for consul-
tation betrveen NATO and WEU.
3. Fraruew,ork ugrcemenlfor lhe lransfer
of NATO ussets to ll'ELl
65. The tu'o organisations are still negotiating
a framework agreernent on the transfer, moni-
toring and return of NATO assets. This u'ould
provide the model for an agreement to be signed
by NATO and WEU each time an operation is
launched entailing use by WEU of NATO
assets. Indeed. the complexity of the financial
and legal issues linked with such an agreernent
calls for a whole gamut of solutions to be ex-
amined. The possibility for WEU to conduct
operations at the direct behest of the E,U. in
accordance u,ith the provisions of the Anr-
sterdarn Treaty'. makes the issue even nrore
complex.
66. Whatever the ultimate solution. the
framerrork agreement. which should be trnal-
ised in tirne for the Washington Summit. must
preserve WEU's decision-making aLrtonomy'
and its unified chain of command. and define a
procedure approved by both organisations for
NATO to monitor the use of its assets aud pos-
sibll,to recall them before the end of the WEU-
led operation.
61. The difficultf is not so nruch of a practi-
cal nature. given that in the event of a real crisis
the two organisations, rvhiclt to a large e\tent
have overlapping memberships. u'ould be able
to find a solution. Houever. the existence of
such a framervork agreernent does have political
implications. in that it rvould clearly'rnark
NATO's cornrnitnrent to supporling WEU 
-
albeit rvith no guarantee of automatic sr.rpport 
-
and uould protect WEU against an)' last-minute
denrands on the part of NATO ivhich could
threaten its aLrtor.ror.r.rl'. rvhich probably explains
the difficulties encountered so far in the nego-
tiations. Houever. the political problems raised
by some NATO rlernbers should be resolved in
time for the Washington Summrt. The officials
questioned during the dratiing of this report
uere. in anv case. optimistic on this point.
4. N,ITO assels wltich cun be made avuilable
to w'EU 
- 
CJTF HQs
68. The development of thc European Secu-
ritl and Defence Identity, as stated in the final
comrnunique of the ministerial meeting of the
Nofth Atlantic Council in Berlin in 1996. nrust
be fbLrnded on the:
"identification. rvithin the Alliance. of the
t1,pes of separable but not separate ca-
pabilities. assets and supporl assets. as
uell as. in order to prepare for WEU-led
operations. separable but not separate
HQs. HQ elernents and comrnand posi-
tions, that rlould be required to command
and conduct WEU-led operations and
17
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rvhich could be rnade available. subject to
decision by the NAC."
69. We note that good pro-qress has been
made u ithin the Alliance in this area. The
preparations for erercises to irnplement the
CJ'IF (Combined Joint Task Forces) concept, as
uell as Criser-ty'pe exercises. have served to
drarv up a list of those NATO assets which
could be made ar,ailable to WEU. These assets
consist essentially of:
American heavy assets: logistic trans-
poft aircraft. observation satellites
(although Europe has access to Helios
images through the Torrejon Satellite
Centre):
specific NATO assets. rvhich are rare:
AWACS (although some WEU coun-
tries also have such aircraft);
NATO cornmand assets. cornmunica-
tion equiprnent. HQ or HQ-supporl
elements. knorvn as CJTF (Cornbined
Joint Task Forces) HQs.
10. ln order to have combined joint headquar-
ters deploy'able in the theatre of operations and
ready to be made available to WEU. on the
basis ol a decision by the Nofth Atlantic
Council, the Alliance has decided to designate
amorlg its "parent HQs" a core staff composed
of European officers which could be beef-ed up
on request using elemerrts supplied by other
NATO or national bodies. Such a CJTF HQ
concept allows a flexible. rnultinational ap-
proach which could. if required. be extended to
include countries which are not firll members of
WEU. This w'as the principle Lrsed for the
IFOPJSFOR HQ in Bosnia.
11. The CJTF HQs woLrld be set up in the
same \!a) as a NATO CJTF and placed under
the orders of an Operations Comnrander who
uould come under the political control of the
WEU Council. As the operation continued. re-
placement of headquarters persounel rvould al-
low the CJTF HQ to reflect those nations taking
part in that particular WEU-led operation. Horv-
ever. NATO nations have already agreed. in
principle. that these designated NATO CJTF
HQs rvill in fact be provided regardless of the
national contribr.rtion
12. The main "parent HQs" have been se-
lected. but according to NATO officials. a num-
ber of practical problems remain to be resolved
befbre a CJTF HQ can be srviftll' and efficiently
set up in a crisis: designation and training of
staff. taking into accouut the need for staff rota-
tion. their deplol'ment. their upkeep over long
periods. cornmuuicatiorr equipment etc.
73. The relevant NATO militarl' staffs. in
particular the International Military Staff and
the Combined Joint Planning Staff are rvorking
on all these questions in close cooperation rvitlr
the WEU Mrlitary StafT. From the European
point of vierv, a sufficient nurnber of exercises
now needs to be organised in order to demon-
strate the possibility' of "separating" and then
deploying those CJTF for operations under
\\'EU's "political control and strategic direc-
tiou".
5. Arrangentents for a Europeun
chain of cortttttuild w,ithin *'ATO
74. The Berlin final communiqu6 of June
1996 is also verl'clear on this issue and it is
imporlant to establish rvhether the intentions
stated at that time lrave been put into practice. It
refers to the:
"elaboration of appropriate multinational
European command arrangements lvithin
NATO, consistent witlr and taking full
advantage of the CJTF concept, able to
prepare. support, cornnrand and conduct
the WEU-led operations. This implies
double-hatting appropriate personnel
uithin the NATO cornmarrd structure to
perform these functions. Such European
commarrd arrangements shoLrld be identi-
fiable (...)".
15. According to )'our Rapporteur's informa-
tion, the tu'o organisations have agreed on the
principle of the European General appointed
Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) playing a
specifically' European role, considering hirn. in
particular. as an ideal candidate for the post of
Operations Commander for a WEU-led opera-
tion. If he uas not chosen for that job, Deputl,
SACEUR uould remain in charge of coordinat-
ing the NATO support provided to WEU. Horv-
ever, it uould appear that no follorv-up has. as
1'et. beerr given to the plan for setting Lrp uithin
SHAPE and the CJPS a chain of E,uropean offi-
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cers under Deputy SACEUR's command in or-
der to perform the tasks set out in the Berlin
communiqu6, and that the role of Deputy'
SACEUR hirnself has not yet been finalised. All
this is essential for establishing a genuinely
European chain of command.
76. These doubts as to w'hether NATO really
intends to let Deputi' SACEUR (D/SACEUR)
be designated WEU Operations Cornmander
rvere conf-irmed during the recent visit by the
Assembh''s Political and Defence Comrlittees
to SHAPE (Mons). It was clear to the members
of our Assembly' that D/SACEUR considered
this to be a secondary role and that he had other
things on his mind than preparing to assume it.
Moreover, he himself pointed out that during an
emerging crisis he rvould have a part to play in
SHAPE rvhich he could probably not abandon.
even for an operation conducted in the WE,U
framework.
71. Thus the problern of WEU Operatiorts
Commander needs to be solved, since it cannot
be D/SACEUR. Moreover. steps Inust be taken
to see to it that a European general other than
D/SACEUR is designated to be in charge of the
organisation and operation of the European mil-
itary pillar of the Alliance.
6. Defence planning (ussets plunning)
18. The purpose of NATO's "defence plan-
ning" process. consisting of tuo-y'ear cycles, is
to define the military resources required for
missions and their distribution anrong the mem-
bers of the Alliance. The process was estab-
lished r',ith a view to the implementation of Art-
icle 5 of the Washington Treaty and it was not
considered appropriate for WEU to carry' out the
same work.
'79. For WEU's Petersberg missiotts or
NATO's peace support operations (PSO), the
parlicipation of states is decided at national
level on a case-by'-case basis.
80. It was therefore decided, following the
declaration adopted in Berlin in 1996. to adapt
the Alliance's defence planning process to take
account of WEU's operational requirements for
Petersberg missions, and to involve WEU in
that process. This raises trvo questions:
the arrangements for WEU's partici-
pation;
horv to inl'oh'e WE,U observer couu-
tries which are not nrernbers of the
Alliance (Austria. Finland. Ireland and
Sweden).
81. NATO finalised its rvork on the intesra-
tion of WEU's requirements in its defence plan-
ning process in 1998. taking account. in part-
icular. of the contribution of the obsen'er coun-
tries by means o[ the Partnership for Peace
procedures. The arrangernents agreed between
the organisations would seem to be satisfactory:
drafting of an od hoc report on the
forces of the members of the Alliance
and observer countries u'hich could
participate in WEU-led operations:
- 
joint NATOiWEU rneeting. attended
by the obsen'ers, in order to assess
that report before NATO's annual de-
fence planning review;
numerous arrangements allowing WEU
to intervene at various stages in
NATO's two-)'ear defence planning
cycle and the possibility for the WEU
Militarl, StatT to take action on behalf
ofthe "1 8".
Fr"rrther progress is required on a nurnber of
points. in particular as regards taking into ac-
count the specific requirements of Pctersberg-
ty,pe missions in the defence planning question-
naire that member countries are required to fill
in every two years.
82. Above and beyond these procedural mat-
ters. for which satisfactory solutions seem to
have been fbund. rvhat are the fundamental is-
sues raised b1, "forces planning" for WEU mis-
sions?
83. It is irnportant for WEU to have sufficient
forces to conduct an operation. Horvever, there
is no obligation for member countries to make
forces available for Petersberg-t)'pe ntissions
and existing forces mav need to be relieved af-
ter a certain period of time. For these reasons, it
is important to be able to drarv on a sufficierrtll'
large "pool of forces" on a case-by-case basis.
The role of WEU's observer countries and as-
sociate partners is particularly important in that
regard.
84. Finally, experience gathered dr.rring re-
cent peacekeeping missions has demonstrated
l9
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the irnporlance of a number of requirements for
the implernentatiou of the CJTF concept:
deplol able cornmunication/command/
intelligence resources (C-ll )l
strate-eic mobility:
logistic support. transporl and engin-
eering resources;
availabilitr of fbrces consisting. for
example. of police officers. custorns
offlcials or observers.
85. Lastll. at the end of 1998 the NATO In-
ternational Military Staff subnritted a repoft on
available forces and capabilities for WEU-led
operations. on the basis of the forces designated
by WEU rnernber countries and some observers
as being arailable. in principle. fbr Petersberg-
tlpe operations. and on an evaluation of the as-
sets required tor illustratile rnissions on the ba-
sis of information subrnitted bl' \l'ELI at the end
of I 996.
86. This eraluation sho*ed that. in principle.
the fbrces and capabilities nrade available by' the
countries concerned are largelv sufficient. eren
tbr those illustrative nrissions requirinu the
greatcst resources. The craluation. of course.
also revealed a nurnber of ueak points. thc es-
sential ones relating to the requirements nlen-
tioned above.
87. 'fhe kel question. in addition to that of
the CJTF HQs. is whether the conrmand. com-
munication and intellisence resources the
Americans usualll suppll to NATO uould also
be rnade ar,ailable to \I'EU.
7. ,llilitarl,phnning
88. At their ureeting in Berlin in June 1996.
the ministers of the NATO countries aqreed that
the Alliance uould. at the request of WEU,
carr\ out militan plannine for the illustrative
rrission profiles proposed b1' WEU. These illus-
tratir e rnissions are theoretical exarnples of
\&'EU-led Petersberg-ty'pe missions fbr which
\\'EU rvishes to avail itself of NATO assets.
Thel' do not cover the uhole range of ntissious
uhiclr rnav be conducted bi WEU. in particLrlar
those using its ou,n assets and procedures. The
three nraiu illLrstrative missirtn profiles that hale
been chosen are: assistance to cililians. separa-
tion of parties by'force and conflict preventiorr.
89. Accordingll,. in 1996 six illustrative mis-
sion profiles \\'erc conveyed to NATO tbr their
el'aluation and rnilitary'planning. kno*n as
"prelinrinary' planning" u ithin NATO and
WEU. The first results uere submitted to WEU
in spring 1997 and lour Rapporteur is ver1,
pleased to see hon uell the procedure u,orked.
90. Follou'ing this flrst experience. it rr as
decided rvithin NATO to draft a specific docu-
ment on operatioual planninu covering WEU's
requiremeuts and to bring about couvergence
betueen those requiremeuts and the ones arising
out of NATO's non-Article 5 peace support op-
erations (PSO). bv adapting NATO's PSO plan-
ning procedures to take account of \\'EU-led
operations.
91. In order to secure close cooperation be-
tueen NATO and \I'EU, it u,as asreed that con-
tacts betueen the reler'ant bodies. essentrallv the
WEU Planning C'ell and NATO's Combined
Joint Plannin-s Staff. rrould take place on a reg-
r:lar basis. Finalll. in connection u,ith the devel-
oprnent of consultation procedures betu een
\L'ELI and NATO frrr a WEU-led operation
using NATO assets. close. cooperation is plan-
ned bctlveen the various planuine bodies of tlte
tu'o organisations.
8. Truining ond c.rercises
92. lrnplenreutation of the Berlin agreernents
on the ESDI calls for prelinrinarr training
foLrnded on crisis scenarios. The rnost sinrple
erercises to organlse uere the ones aimed at
testing the concept of CJTF HQs. uhicli starled
in 1997. Houever. training for coordinated de-
cision-makinu throLrghout the politico-militarv
chain of the two orsanisations is 
,nruclt rnore
difflcult to organise and requires asreernents to
be concluded in order to harntonise the crisis-
manaqement mechanisms and procedures of the
tuo orqanisations. albeit rn the fonn of interirn
arrangerrents ri'hich can be fine-tuned ou the
basis ofthe exercises.
93. In this area. the recent joint senrinar of
the WELJ and NATO Councils. held on 3 Feb-
ruarl' 1999. uas an importaut step tou'ards per-
fornring a practical studr ofthe different stages
inrolved in the consultation and decision-mak-
ing processes. While progress rlav seern slou,.
given that the- f-irst joint trainins efTorts date
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back to 1995. events are movirrg forward. In-
deed, a rnajor exercise called CMX/Crisex 2000
is planned next year, while planning confer-
ences are due to be held in 1999. It is important
when organising the process to take account of
the desire to involve all 28 members of the
WEU farnily. This exercise would be a crucial
step towards harmonising the NATO and WEU
operational planning structllres.
9.1. As regards the CJTF HQs. the NATO
exercises Allied Effort 9l and Strong Resolve
98 served as full-scale exercises in a crisis scen-
ario, the first involving the deployment of a
CJTF HQ on land, the second at sea, aboard the
American command ship Mount llthitnel'.
95. The evaluatiorr of these two exercises
focused on HQ structuring. in particular, the
method of fbrming the CJTF HQs, operational
planning, command and control capabilities,
and aspects relating to the deplovrnent and sup-
port of the HQs, as well as requirements in the
field of information and command systems
(rcs).
96. Rapid progress is currently being rnade,
drawing also on the experience gathered in
Bosnia. In autumn 1999. the Allied Forces for
South Europe (AFSOUTH) uill be conducting a
major exercise involving. inter uliu, the de-
ploy'rnent of a CJTF HQ (Allied Mix 99).
97. It is, then, essential that CMX/Crisex
2000 should be prepared and conducted with the
utmost attention by all the staff of the numerous
bodies invoh'ed in this exercise. both from
NATO and WEU.
9. Conclusiotts
98. The ELrropean Security and Defence Iden-
tity is in the process of being established at
military level ivithin the Alliance, in accordance
with the decisions taken in Berlin in June 1996.
The efforts being made for that purpose should
be encouraged, in particular by means of all the
work conducted jointly by NATO and WEU.
For the system to work. it is necessary to:
solve the problern of the WEU Opera-
tions Commander. rvho cannot be
D/SACEUR:
appoint a second 
- 
European 
- 
Deputy,
SACEUR in charge of the E,uropean
military pillar of the Alliance;
rapidly finalise the framework agree-
ment:
convince our American allies that the
use of NATO assets and capabilities
rnade available to WEU cannot be
controlled by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil and that even if the planning for
their deployment is conducted by'
NATO military staffs. the r.rltimate
authority for that planning must lie not
rvith the North Atlantic Council, but
the Councilof WEU.
However. there are doubts in the minds of most
rnembers of the Assembly regarding the "pol-
itical autonomy" of this "separable but not sep-
arate" instrument within the Alliance.
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